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Inequity and Bad Conscience:
The Effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Twelve
on Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains three references to Rule 19 of the same Rules. Because of an oversight in the 1966
amendment of the Rules, one of those references is slightly, but critically,
different from the others. Rules 12(b)(7) and 12(g) refer to "a party
under Rule 19," but Rule 12(h)(2) refers to "a party indispensable under
Rule 19."1 This difference allows courts to ignore the dictates of "equity
and good conscience" 2 and may thereby subject parties to contrary rulings from different courts, prejudice the interests of absent persons, and
waste judicial resources.
Consider two victims of reckless drivers; each was injured in exactly
the same way and each brought an identical suit in the same court. They
filed diversity suits in federal court against the drivers, who were from
another state. After the answers were filed, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join an "indispensable" party.3 The cases
are identical in every aspect but one: the owner of the car in one case is a
citizen of this state, in the other case he is a citizen of another state.
In the first case, the court finds that the interests of the unjoined
owner are so important that it would be at odds with "equity and good
conscience" to allow the suit to proceed without him. 4 Since joinder of
the owner would destroy diversity, the court dismisses the action. In the
second case, the court rules that, because the defendant filed the motion
after the answer, the absent driver's interests cannot be considered, and
the court continues to hear the case. 5
In some courts, this is exactly the situation that exists. 6 Despite the
fact that the absent persons' interests are identical, the court will consider them in one case and ignore them in the other. This creates inequity by treating like parties differently. It also wastes judicial resources
because the ignored party is likely to institute a new round of proceedings in order to protect his interests.
This Note explores the creation of this anomalous situation and suggests ways to eliminate it. Part I discusses Rule 19 and the policies underlying it. Part II examines Rule 12 and its references to Rule 19
parties. Part III analyzes the judicial interpretation of Rule 12. Part IV
considers whether there is any reason to differentiate between absent
persons the way some courts find Rule 12 does, concluding that inter1 For further discussion of this difference, see infra text accompanying notes 53-67.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
3 This state has a law that specifies that the driver of a car is the agent of the owner. The
defendant contends that, since any finding of liability of the agent will be necessarily imputed to the
principal, the owner of the car must be joined in the action.
4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
5 See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
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pretating the Rule in such a way as to distinguish between these parties
frustrates the goals of Rule 19. Finally, Part V suggests several ways to
eliminate the inequitable treatment of these parties.
I. Compulsory Joinder: The Policies Underlying Rule 19
This section provides a brief history of compulsory joinder and an
analysis of the Federal Rules that deal with it. Some familiarity with compulsory joinder is necessary to appreciate the problem created by Rule
12's inconsistent references to Rule 19.
A. Compulsory Joinder Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English Chancery courts developed a pragmatic and reasonably workable doctrine of
compulsory joinder. 7 The English rule held that all parties who had an
interest in the action should be joined unless it was impossible or extremely impractical.8 Further, the courts established that a person who
was not a party to the action was not bound by the decree. 9
In the late 1700's, the concept of an "indispensable" party was developed. The indispensable party was one without which the court could
not proceed.1 0 The doctrine became less pragmatic and more rigid over
time, until questions of joinder were determined solely by whether unjoined parties were classified as indispensable.I
American courts adopted the indispensable party concept, albeit in a
less rigid form. The most influential American decision was the Supreme
Court's 1854 holding in Shields v. Barrow.1 2 In reversing the lower court,
7 For a more extensive discussion of compulsory joinder in the early English courts, see Hazard, Indispensable Party: The HistoricalOrigin of a ProceduralPhantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961).
Professor Hazard points out that early works such as Browne's PravisAlmae CuriaeCancellariae(1 st ed.
1694/95) and Bohun's Cursus Cancillariae (2d ed. 1723) included rules on the joinder of parties.
Hazard, supra, at 1262, 1263. By 1730, an English treatise could state:
[G]reat care is to be taken that there be proper Partiesnamed in the Bill; and if those whose
Right is concerned, are not made Parties, the Defendant may demur to such Bill; or if he
doth not, the court will not Proceed to a Decree; or if a Decree be made thereon, it may be
reversed.
Id. at 1263 (quotingJacob, THE COMPLEAT CHANCERY-PRACTISER 139-40 (1730)).

8 Hazard, supra note 7, at 1255.
9 Id.
10 See Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C.C. 276, 29 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1787), where the court considered a
suit by a second mortgagee against the first mortgagee in possession seeking an accounting of rents
and profits. The mortgagor had died and his heir was in America. The defendant argued the heir
should be joined, lest the defendant find himself subject to double liability. The court said: "It
seems impossible to me [to proceed] ... without making the mortgagor or his heir a party." 29 Eng.
Rep. at 153.
11 Thus, in 1829, a Chancery court wrote "[tihe rule may be inconvenient or absurd, and may
require the interference of the Legislature; but the settled doctrines of the Court are not to be
overturned on a mere allegation that the rule may be inconvenient." Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim. 466,
467, 57 Eng. Rep. 862, 863 (Ch. 1829).
12 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). As one commentator wrote:
[The decision's] brief catalog of parties in equity actions has been generally accepted in
subsequent federal cases and is based on principles applicable to state courts as well. Also,
the compulsoryjoinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to law
and equity alike, stem more or less directly from the Shields v. Barrow formulation.
Reed, Compulsony Joinderof Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 340 (1957).
The case involved Shields, a Louisiana citizen, who purchased a plantation from Barrow for
$227,000. 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 138. The amount was secured by a note endorsed by six individuals,
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the Supreme Court explained that there were three classes of parties to a
bill in equity. They were: 1) formal parties; 2) necessary parties, who
have an interest in the action and should be joined if feasible; and 3)
indispensable parties, whose interest is so intertwined with the controversy that it would be inequitable for the court to proceed without
13

them.

Thus, the Court in Barrow drew a dividing line between "necessary"
and "indispensable" parties.14 Necessary parties would bejoined if practical, but a court could proceed without them. A decree made in the
absence of an indispensable party, however, would be "wholly inconsistent
four from Louisiana and two from Mississippi. Id. at 130. When Shields defaulted on the note,
Barrow obtained a judgment against Shields and one of the endorsers. A compromise settlement
was negotiated. Id. at 138.
Barrow brought an action to set aside the settlement, claiming it had been obtained improperly.
Id. He filed suit against the Mississippi endorsers in the federal Circuit Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana. Because the court's jurisdiction was based on diversity, he could not join the Louisiana
parties without ousting the court ofjurisdiction. (As the reader is probably aware, federal diversity
actions require that all defendants be from a state other than that of any of the plaintiffs. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Federal diversity requirements are codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).) The Court found that the Louisiana endorsers were indispensable to the
action, and reversed the Circuit Court's decision allowing Barrow to maintain his suit in their absence. Id. at 142, 146.
13 The Court described
three classes of parties to a bill in equity: They are: 1. Formal Parties. 2. Persons having an
interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may
act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy,
and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties
before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final
justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable
parties. 3. Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such
a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving
the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience.
58 U.S. (17 How.) at 139.
14 I hesitate to use the terms "necessary party" and "indispensable party" because I believe they
contribute to the confusion surrounding the issue of compulsory joinder. Necessity and indispensability are not appropriately used in reference to parties. In actuality, the concepts apply to the
situation in which the court finds itself, not any trait or aspect of the party.
The Federal Rules advisory committee has recognized this fact. The terms "necessary party"
and "indispensable party" do not appear in the amended Rule 19. See infra note 19 for the text of
Rule 19. The committee deleted the word "necessary" and attempted to remove the word "indispensable" from the Rule as well. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. When the word
"indispensable" was used, the committee emphasized the correct focus by using the word in a context that made it clear that it referred to the court's determination of what should be done in the
situation, rather than an inherent trait of the party. The Rule refers to the court's analysis of the
situation, saying that if the court decides to dismiss the action after considering the factors listed in
Rule 19(b), the person is "thus regarded as indispensable." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). In
the note to Rule 19, the committee further emphasized that this term refers to the court's
determination:
The subdivision uses the word "indispensable" only in a conclusory sense, that is, a
person is "regarded as indispensable" when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors above mentioned, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to dismiss the action, rather than to retain it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
The confusion occurs when the phrase "the court finds itself in a situation in which it is necessary to join the party, X" is shortened to "the court finds the party, X, necessary," which is then
further condensed to "X is a necessary party." While this phrasing is more succinct, it seems to
indicate that necessity is a quality of the party, rather than the court's circumstance. This "direct[s]
attention to the technical or abstract character of the rights or obligations of the person whose join-
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with equity and good conscience'15 and was prohibited. This formulation became the basis for American doctrine on compulsory joinder of
parties. 16
B.

CompulsoryJoinder under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1. The Development of Rule 19
The compulsory joinder rules of Shields v. Barrow 17 were incorporated into Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.18
The Rule remained unchanged until 1966, when it was extensively
amended.19 While the courts generally understood the propositions
der [is] in question, and correspondingly distract[s] attention from the pragmatic considerations
which should be controlling." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
On the other hand, the full explication of the situational nature of the concepts of necessity and
indispensability is somewhat unwieldy for use in an extended discussion of compulsory joinder, and
the terms "necessary party" and "indispensable party" are the usual method of expression. For the
sake of readability, the shortened expressions are used in this Note.
15 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 139.
16 See Reed, supra note 12.
17 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
18 The original version of Rule 19 read:
NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) NecessaryJoinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of
this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on the same
side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do
so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
(b) Effect of Failure tojoin. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded to those already parties, have not been
made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process
and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court ofjurisdiction of the parties
before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action. The court in its
discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction
over them as to either service of process or venue can be acquired only by their consent or
voluntary appearance or if, though they are subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would
deprive the court ofjurisdiction of the parties before it, but the judgment rendered therein
does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (1938). This version remained unchanged until the 1966 amendment.
19 FED. R. Cxv. P. 19 is entitled "Joinder of Persons Needed forJust Adjudication." Sections (a)
and (b) of the rule state:
(a) Persons to beJoined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whosejoinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a
party. If the person should join as a plaintiffbut refuses to do so, the person may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
andjoinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by the Court Whenever Joinder is Not Feasible. If a person as
described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before
it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The
factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in
the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment ren-

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:422

upon which both the pre and postamendment Rule were based, and
often applied the Rule correctly, the text of the Rule sometimes caused
misinterpretation. 20 The Federal Rules advisory committee listed a
number of specific "[t]extual defects" in the original rule,2 1 and stated
that the Rule failed to point to the relevant factors to be considered in
deciding whether an action should proceed without the absent person or
22
be dismissed.
Commentators had criticized Rule 19 extensively. 2 3 Generally, they
contended that the Rule provided insufficient guidance to the district
courts 24 and led to the elevation of form over substance, ajurisprudence
of labels. 25 While the original Rule "could be and often was applied in
consonance with" the 2propositions
upon which the Rule was based,2 6 it
7
was often misapplied.
One focus of the criticism of the pre-1966 Rule was the district
courts' application of the concept of "indispensable" parties. 28 A draft
of the proposed amended Rule which eliminated the term "indispensadered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Id.
20

The advisory committee wrote:
The foregoing propositions [those upon which Rule 19 is based] were well understood in
older equity practice and Rule 19 could be and often was applied in consonance with them.
But experience showed that the [pre-1966] rule was defective in phrasing and did not point
clearly to the proper basis of decision.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) (citation omitted).
21 The advisory committee explained:
(1) the expression "persons... who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded to
those already parties" was not adequately descriptive of the category,
(2) the term "indispensable" did not adequately describe the category intended by the rule,
(3) the terms "indispensable" and "joint interest" directed the courts' attention to the wrong
factors,
(4) the use of the word "jurisdiction" caused confusion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
22 "The original rule did not state affirmatively what factors were relevant in deciding whether
the action should proceed or be dismissed when joinder of interested persons was infeasible." FED.
R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
23 The advisory committee's note refers to a number of critics, including: Reed, supra note 12;
Hazard, supra note 7; N.Y. Temporary Comm. on Courts, First PreliminaryReport, Legis. Doc. 1957
No. 6(b); N.Y. Judicial Council, Twelfth Ann. Rep., Legis. Doc. 1946, No. 17; Joint Comm. on Michigan Procedural Revision, Final Report, Pt. III (1960); Note, IndispensableParties in the FederalCourts, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1952); Developments in the Law-Multipar' Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 874 (1958); MicH. GEN. COURT RULES, R. 205 (effective Jan. 1, 1963); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &

R., § 1001 (effective Sept. 1, 1963). FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's notes (1966).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
25 See Kaplan, Continuing l'ork of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 362 (1967) (describing the classification of cases as based on a
"sloganeering process").
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) states:
In some instances courts did not undertake the relevant inquiry or were misled by the jurisdiction fallacy. In other instances there was undue preoccupation with abstract classifications of rights or obligations, as against consideration of the particular consequences of the
action.
Id.
28 "The indispensable party concept.. . has occasioned much confusion in the cases." Hazard,
supra note 7, at 1255.
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ble" was circulated, 29 but met with criticism.3 0 Ultimately, the term was

included in the final draft of the 1966 amendment,3 1 but the advisory
by noting that the word was used
committee sought to limit its'3 impact
2
only in a "conclusory sense."
The Supreme Court has noted that the 1966 amendment was not
meant to constitute a change in principles. 3 3 Rather, the goal of the
amendment was to remove the focus of the consideration from the abstract character of the rights of the parties 34 and to make it clear that:
[w]hether a person is "indispensable," that is, whether the lawsuit
must be dismissed in the absence of that person, can only be determined in the context of the particular litigation.... The decision ...
must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such
factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests. 3 5
29 The proposed amendment of Rule 19 read:
Rule 19: Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) PERSONS To BEJOINED IF FEASIBLE. Whenever a "contingently necessary" person,
as hereafter defined, is subject to service of process and his joinder would not deprive the
court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, he shall bejoined as a party to the
action. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would
render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
A person is contingently necessary if (1) complete relief cannot be accorded in his
absence among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter substantially impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest.
(b) Determination by Court WheneverJoindernot Feasible. If a contingently necessary person cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action ought to proceed among the parties before it or ought to be dismissed.
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent ajudgment rendered
in the absence of the contingently necessary person might be prejudicial to him or those
already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether ajudgment rendered in the absence of the contingently necessary person would be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were
dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments, 1964).
30 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 366 (1967).

31 See supra note 19.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966). The full text of the relevant section
states:
The subdivision uses the word "indispensable" only in a conclusory sense, that is, a person
is "regarded as indispensable" when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of
the factors above-mentioned, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to
dismiss the action, rather than to retain it.
Id.
33 "The new text of the Rule was not intended as a change in principles." Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12 (1968).
34 The goal of the amendment was to direct attention away from consideration of "the technical
or abstract character of the rights or obligations of the persons whose joinder is in question." FED.
R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
35 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 390 U.S. at 118-119.
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The amendment thus refocuses attention
on the practical effects of pro6
ceeding with or dismissing the action.3
2.

Rule 19 Today

Rule 19 is designed to protect three classes of interests: (1) the public's interest in preventing multiple and duplicative litigation, (2) the interest of the parties before the court in avoiding exposure to duplicate or
inconsistent liability,3 7 and (3) the absent person's interest in avoiding

prejudice as a result of the decision. 38 The Rule is designed to assist the
courts in 39 "rendering complete justice with as little litigation as
possible."
Depending upon the circumstances and facts of the case, Rule 19
provides a court with three possible courses of action. First, the court
might proceed with the action without the absent person. Rule 19 allows
the court to proceed if it finds either (a) that the absent person is not
necessary to the action, or (b) that the person is necessary but cannot be
joined and is not "indispensable" to the action. 40 Second, the court
might find the person is necessary, and joinable. In that case, Rule 19
requires joinder.41 Finally, the court may find that the person is indispensable and, that joinder is not feasible. In this situation, the court
42
must dismiss the action.
Rule 19 establishes a three-part test to determine whether the court
should proceed, orderjoinder of the absent person, or dismiss the case.
First, a court must determine whether the person is "needed for just adjudication." 43 Rule 19(a) establishes two tests for determining whether a
party is "necessary." A party is deemed necessary if "in his absence com36 "[T]he new version emphasizes the pragmatic consideration of the effects of the alternatives
of proceeding or dismissing." Id. at 116 n.12.
37 While this particular goal is usually stated in terms of the party's interest, it should be noted
that the courts also have an interest in avoiding subjecting a party to inconsistent liabilities. Courts
have an interest in having their judgments enforced. Inconsistent judgments put the courts into
conflict with each other. Or, should multiple actions occur in the same court, a court might find
itself in conflict with itself.
38 Under a section entitled "The Aniended Rule," the advisory note to the 1966 amendment states
that:
Clause (1) stresses the desirability of joining those persons in whose absence the court
would be obliged to grant partial or "hollow" rather than complete relief to the parties
before the court. The interests that are being furthered here are not only those of the
parties, but also that of the public in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter. Clause 2(i) recognizes the importance of protecting the person whosejoinder
is in question against the practical prejudice to him which may arise through a disposition of
the action in his absence. Clause 2(ii)
recognizes the need for considering whether a party
may be left, after the adjudication, in a position where a person not joined can subject him
to a double or otherwise inconsistent liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966); See also Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 365 (1967).
39

J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.5 (1985).

40 Rule 19 does not specifically describe the situations in which the court may proceed without
the absent person. Instead, they are the default situations in which the court finds it need not order
either joinder or dismissal. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, quoted supra note 19.
41 FED. R. Cirv. P. 19(a).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
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plete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties. '4 4 A party
is also necessary if he has an interest in the action which will be impaired
by the action's disposition or which will leave another party subject to a
substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. 4 5
Second, if the party is necessary, a court must determine whether
joinder is feasible. Rule 19's test for feasibility ofjoinder is whether the
46
party is subject to service and whether the court will retain jurisdiction.
44
45

Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) deems a party necessary if
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest.

Id.
46 Rule 19(a) states that if the "necessary" party is one "who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action [the
party] shall bejoined in the action." Id. The advisory committee's note states that "[i]fa party has a
valid objection to venue and chooses to assert it, he will be dismissed from the action." FED. R. Civ.
P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
The possibility of error creeps in here. The Rule says "If a person as described in subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof [a necessary party] cannot be made a party, the court shall [determine whether the
party is indispensable]." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). Despite the fact that the advisory
committee's note makes it clear that this statement simply refers to when the court must proceed with
the analysis, this language has been interpreted as introducing a condition precedent to whether the
party can be indispensable.
The better interpretation is that the issue ofjoinability is only relevant as an indication of when
the court will have to continue its analysis to determine whether to proceed, or may simply order
joinder. First, note that the title of subparagraph (b) of Rule 19 is "Determination by Court Whenever
Joinder not Feasible." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added).
The advisory committee's note actually substitutes the word "when" for the Rule's "if" in the
portion of Rule 19(b) quoted above:
Wlhen a person as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) cannot be made a party, the court
is to determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties already before it or should be dismissed.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) (emphasis added). The note also makes this
point in several other places:
Whenever feasible, the persons materially interested in the subject of an action ...
should be joined as parties so that they may be heard and a complete disposition made.
When this comprehensive joinder cannot be accomplished ...the case should be examined
pragmatically and a choice made between the alternatives of proceeding in the action in the
absence of the interested persons, and dismissing the action....
The subdivision uses the word "indispensable" in a conclusory sense, that is, a person
is "regarded as indispensable" when he cannot be made a party, and upon consideration of
the factors above-mentioried, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to
dismiss the action, rather than to retain it.
Id. (emphasis added).
Despite this evidence, some commentators seem to interpret the issue ofjoinability as a substantive criterion for whether or not a party may be regarded as indispensable. Thus, one treatise states
"an indispensable party is, by definition, one whosejoinder is not feasible." 2AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

12.08[3] n.4 (1987).

This interpretation constitutes a significant

change from traditional compulsoryjoinder doctrine. The idea that the 1966 amendment of Rule 19
constituted such a change has been specifically rejected. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 116 (1968) ("The new text of the Rule [19] was not intended as a change in
principles."), see LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE PUBLISHING Co., FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 59:76 (1984)
("[T]he 1966 revision of FRCP 19 ... was not intended as a change in principle.").
Feasibility ofjoinder is not relevant to the purposes of compulsory joinder as defined by Rule
19. The interests of the parties, the absent persons, and the court are the same whether or not the
joinder of the absent person is feasible. See ifra note 131 and accompanying text.
Further, feasibility ofjoinder is too inflexible a criterion of indispensability. Suppose a court
found that an absent person was necessary and joinder was feasible. But, for some reason, that
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If joinder is feasible, the Rule states the person "shall be joined." 4 7
Finally, if joinder of a necessary party is not feasible, Rule 19(b)
states that "the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should
' 48
be dismissed, the absent person thus being regarded as indispensable."
The Rule lists several factors a court should consider in making this determination, including the extent of the effect of any judgment, the degree to which the judgment can be shaped to avoid an undesirable effect,
the availability of other measures to lessen any prejudice, the adequacy
and the availability of a remedy
of any judgment in the person's absence,
49
to the plaintiff if the case is dismissed.
Thus, the new wording of Rule 19 brings the issue of compulsory
joinder full circle. The pragmatic analysis used by the early English equity courts has, once again, been established as the optimal approach to
the issue of compulsory joinder of absent persons.
II.

Rule 12 and Parties Needed for Just Adjudication

Rule 12 specifies the timing and procedures for pleading defenses
and objections to the complaint. 50 Rule 12 includes three references to
person intentionally avoided service of process. To say that the court could not find the party indispensable and must continue the action puts the court into an untenable position.
A better interpretation of Rule 19 is that an absent person may be indispensable without reference to whetherjoinder of the person is feasible. The issue ofjoinability is only relevant concerning
what course of action the court should take when it determines the absent person is necessary.
47
48
49

FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) provides:
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

Id.
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 12 is entitled "Defenses and Objections-When and How Presented-By
Pleadings or Motion-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings." The relevant sections of the rule
state:
(b) Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required
to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or
fact to that claim for relief.
(g) Consolidation of Defenses in Motion. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it any other motions herein provided for and then available to the party. Ifa
party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then
available to the party which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not
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Rule 19 parties (parties needed forjust adjudication). 5 1 There is a slight
but critical difference in wording between one of the references and the
other two. 52 Prior to 1966, this difference did not exist. This difference
in wording creates a situation which leads courts to misinterpret Rule 19
and treat similar parties differently. This section explains the origins and
consequences of the difference between these references.
A.

The References to Rule 19 in Rule 12(b) & (g)

Rule 12(b) is the basic provision governing when defenses to a complaint may or must be pleaded. It provides that "[e]very defense.., to a
claim ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion:... (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19."53 A party
is allowed to plead this defense, and certain other defenses listed in Rule
12, 5 4 prior to the answer because they are "matters of abatement" 55
which may eliminate the need to file an answer. Expedited
treatment of
56
these defenses permits more efficient adjudication.
Subsection (g) of Rule 12 deals with whether a party may bring successive Rule 12 motions. It limits a party to a single Rule 12 motion.
Rule 12(g) provides that if a party makes a Rule 12 motion and omits any
of the Rule 12 objections from the motion, the party may not bring another motion based on any of the Rule 12 objections, except for certain7
5
objections automatically preserved from such waiver by Rule 12(h)(2).
thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as
provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any of the grounds there stated.
(h) Waiver or Preservation of Certain Defenses.
(1) A defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of
process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in the
circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by motion under this
rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule
15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense of
failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a)
or by motion forjudgment on the pleadings, or at trial on the merits.
(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
Id.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 53-63.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
54 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l)-(6), quoted supra note 50.
55 J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.24 (1985).
56 In cases where the issue ofjoinder is linked with the facts of the case, however, the decision
on the motion may be delayed until sufficient facts are developed. See, e.g., Francis Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 661 F.2d 873 (10th Cir. 1981).
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g). The original Rule 12 did not require this consolidation. This failure led
to dilatory trial practices. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1384

(1969). The section was amended in 1948 to eliminate these practices. "The enforced consolidation
of matters in the motion, the interdicting of successive motions, is justified as helping to avoid piecemeal, repetitious handling of the early phase of a lawsuit before the defendant has committed himself even to a full statement of his own position by answer." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(II), 81 HARV. L. REV. 501, 605 (1968).
For a discussion of Rule 12(h)(2), see infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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Since it refers to all Rule 12 defenses as a group, Rule 12(g) incorporates
the Rule 12(b)(7) reference to Rule 19 parties.
B.

The Genesis of Inequity: The Reference to Rule 19 in Rule 12(h)

Rule 12(h) deals with waiver of the defenses listed in Rule 12(b).
Rule 12(h)(1) provides that the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction,
58
improper venue, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service,
are waived if they are either omitted from a Rule 12(b) motion or are
neither made by motion nor included in a responsive pleading. Rule
12(h)(2) provides that the defenses of failure to state a legal claim or
defense 59 and "failure to join a party indispensable under Rule- 19"6o are
not waived by failure to plead in a 12(b) motion or in the answer. Inmay make these claims in any pleading, at trial, or even on
stead, a6 party
1
appeal.
Note that the Rule 12(h)(2) reference to Rule 19 parties differs from
the Rule 12(b) reference. 62 Rule 12(b) refers to a "party under Rule 19,"
which includes both "necessary" parties, as defined in Rule 19(a), and
"indispensable" parties, as defined in Rule 19(b). Rule 12(h)(2), however, refers only to "a party indispensable under Rule 19."63
Assuming there are distinct objections for failure to join necessary
and indispensable parties, 64 Rule 12(h) nowhere mentions the objection
of failure to join a necessary party. The objection is neither specifically
preserved in 12(h)(2), nor listed among those objections waived in
12(h) (1). This leaves courts without guidance as to whether that particular objection is waived by, or preserved against, failure to plead in or
before the answer. Since Rule 12(g) prevents a second Rule 12 motion
based on any Rule 12 objection, failure to join a necessary party probably
could not be the basis of a second Rule 12 motion. 65 But nothing in Rule
12(h) indicates the status of this defense if there is no Rule 12 motion.
Furthermore, if a Rule 12 motion is made, Rule 12(h) does not address
58 These are the defenses listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5).
59 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
61 These defenses "may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by
motion forjudgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). This
section has been interpreted to allow the objection of failure to join an indispensable party to be
raised for the first time on appeal. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 111 (1968). This protection from waiver by failure to plead is not, however, absolute:
[Wihen the moving party is seeking dismissal in order to protect himself against a later suit
by the absent person ... and is not seeking vicariously to protect the absent person against
a prejudicial judgment .... his undue delay in making the motion can properly be counted
against him as a reason for denying the motion.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
62 The Rule 12(b) reference to Rule 19 is incorporated in Rule 12(g).
63 This creates a question as to just what defense is preserved in Rule 12(h)(2). See infra text
accompanying note 78.
64 See infra text accompanying note 128.
65 On the other hand, as explained below, the correct interpretation of Rule 19 eliminates the
artificial division of parties into the necessary and indispensable party categories, see infra text accompanying note 128. Thus, a motion to join a necessary party under Rule 19, like an objection for
failure to join an indispensable party, should be available at any stage in the proceedings. See infra
notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
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the question of whether the objection may be raised in the answer or in
the ways listed in Rule 12(h)(2).
This lack of guidance creates the inequitable treatment of necessary
parties under the Federal Rules. Rule 19 was amended to eliminate
courts' attention to "abstract classifications of rights" and focus the
courts on the practical effects of proceeding with or dismissing the
case.6 6 Thus, a party can only be considered indispensable after consideration of the factors in Rule 19.67 But the difference in wording within
Rule 12 leads the courts to look for a method of distinguishing necessary
parties from indispensable parties before engaging in the Rule 19 analysis, in direct contradiction to the purpose of Rule 19.
C. Planting the Seed: The 1966 Amendment of Rule 12
Prior to 1966, the wording of the separate references in Rule 12 to
Rule 19 parties was consistent. Both Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 12(h)(2)
used the same language to refer to Rule 19 parties. 68 But when Rule 19
was amended in 1966, the Rule 12 references to Rule 19 also had to be
revised. In fact, the advisory committee's note specifically explains that
Rule 12(b)(7) was changed "to accord with the amendment of Rule
19."69

Rule 12(h) underwent an independent revision in 1966.70 Prior to
that time, the circuits were split over whether a Rule 12(b) objection that
71
had been omitted from a 12(b) motion could be pleaded in the answer.
Some courts had decided that the failure to include the objection constituted a waiver of the objection. 7 2 Other courts held that a party could
still plead the objection. 73 The 1966 amendment of Rule 12(h) was
74
designed to eliminate this ambiguity.
Thus, in 1966, both Rules 19 and 12(h) simultaneously underwent
extensive revision. The proposed Rule 19 eliminated the term "indis66 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
67 See supra note 32.
68 Both sections referred to "an indispensable party under Rule 19." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (1963).
Of course, the pre-1966 Rule 19 spoke only in terms of "indispensable" parties, see supra note 18, so
such a reference was appropriate.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 12 advisory committee's note (1966).
70 Rule 12(g) also underwent minor amendment to conform to the amendment of Rule 12(h). 5
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1384. The major amendment of Rule
12(g) occurred in 1948. The original Rule 12 simply stated that a party could plead Rule 12(b)
objections in a pre-answer motion. Defendants would occasionally abuse this privilege by bringing a
series of Rule 12(b) motions, each pleading a different objection, for purely dilatory purposes. The
1948 amendment required the consolidation of these defenses in a single motion. "The enforced
consolidation of matters .. .is justified as helping to avoid piecemeal, repetitious handling of the
early phase of a lawsuit before the defendant has committed himself even to a full statement of his
own position by answer." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (11), 81 HARV. L. REv. 501, 605 (1968).
71 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (11), 81 HARV. L. REv. 501, 605 (1968).
72 See, e.g., Keefe v. Dorounian, 6 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1946); Elbinger v. Precision Metal Workers
Corp., 18 F.R.D. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
73 See, e.g. Phillips Neset v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941); Crum v. Graham, 32 F.R.D. 173
(D.Mont. 1963).
74 The advisory committee's note specifically states: "Amended subdivision (h)(1)(A) eliminates
the ambiguity." FED. R. Cxv. P. 12 advisory committee's note (1966).
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pensable. ' ' 75 The final amendment, however, reinserted the term, but
only in a conclusory sense. 7 6 Rule 12(b) was amended to reflect this
change in Rule 19. But Rule 12(h) was left with the same reference to
Rule 19 that was used in the pre-1966 rule.
This difference in language is the basis for the disparate treatment of
joinable and non-joinable parties which have identical interests in an action. Almost certainly, the difference was not intentional. Instead, the
retention of the pre-1966 reference to Rule 19 in Rule 12(h)(2) was
77
probably a mere oversight in drafting.
First, the very fact that the wording of the references in Rules 12(b)
and 12(h) is inconsistent indicates that the distinction was unintentional.
If the drafters intended to create different objections for failure to join a
necessary party and for failure to join an indispensable party, the objections would be distinguished in Rule 12(b), where possible objections are
listed. This internal inconsistency seems to create a situation where Rule
12(h)(2) preserves an objection that does not exist (failure to join an indispensable party) while the Rule 12(b)(7) objection (failure to join a party
under Rule 19) is not included in Rule 12(h)'s comprehensive guide to
78
waiver or preservation of the Rule 12 defenses.
Further, this inconsistency means that the ambiguity the 1966
amendment to Rule 12(h) was designed to eliminate still exists with regard to the objection of failure to join a necessary party. Rule 12(h)(1)
does not include the objection as one that is waived if it is not pleaded in
a 12(b) motion or in the responsive pleading. Neither does Rule 12(h)(2)
specify that the objection is preserved against such waiver. 79
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32.
As one commentator noted:
[T]he discrepancy in the wording of Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 12(h)(2) probably reflects a
drafting oversight on the part of the Advisory Committee that prepared the 1966 amendments. Both Rule 12(h) and Rule 19 were undergoing extensive revision simultaneously; at
the same time Rule 12(b)(7) was being altered to conform it with the changes in Rule 19. It
is quite possible that in the final adjustment of Rule 12(h) and Rule 19, which reintroduced
a reference to the indispensable party concept in the latter rule, the semantic discrepancy
between Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 12(h)(2) and the absence of a specific provision governing
rule 19(a) persons were overlooked.
7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1609 (1986).
78 One might argue that the drafters assumed knowledge of the different classifications of parties
under Rule 19 (a difficult argument considering the drafters comments that distinctions based on
abstract classifications of parties are not appropriate to Rule 19 analysis, see supra notes 24-27, 32, 34
and accompanying text), and so intended that Rule 12(h)(2) would preserve one category of objection allowed by Rule 12(b) (7). That, however, creates the difficult question of why the drafters then
flatly ignored the other category.
79 See supra note 50 for the text of Rule 12(h)(2). The ambiguity may be at least partially resolved by reference to the Rule 12(b) admonition that "Every defense, in law or fact . . . shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading." FED. R. Clv. P. 12(b). This section would seem to require a
finding that the objection is waived ifnot pleaded in the answer. Rule 12(b) goes on, however, to say
that "[a] motion making any of these [Rule 12(b)] defenses shall be made before the pleading if a
further pleading is permitted." FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b). This statement specifies when a party must
bring the motion if a further pleading is permitted, but does not say if there is a time limit on the
motion when no further pleading is permitted. Arguably, once the Rule 7(a) pleadings are completed, a party could bring the motion at any time. Rule 12(g) solves the problem once a Rule 12(b)
motion is made, but Rule 12(h) does not provide guidance if no Rule 12(b) motion is made. In any
case, this analysis does not resolve the question of whether the objection may be pleaded in the
answer even if omitted from a 12(b) motion. It is also interesting to note that the courts that have
75
76
77
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Second, the Rules themselves contradict the idea that a motion that
results in an order requiring joinder of an absent person may only be
brought at certain stages of the action.8 0 Rule 21 specifically states that a
party may bring a motion to requirejoinder at any stage of the proceed8
ing, without limitation as to the reason. '
Third, there is no reason to treat the two objections differently. The
goals of Rule 19 apply equally to both necessary and indispensable parties.8 2 Indeed, there may be absolutely no difference whatsoever between the position of an indispensable party and a necessary party in
relation to the goals of requiring compulsoryjoinder. Yet, because some
courts interpret Rule 12 to distinguish between these parties, they may
83
be treated differently.
Fourth, the fact that the advisory committee's note suggests no reason for differentiating between the two objections indicates that the differentiation was unintentional. An intentional differentiation would have
constituted a significant change in the law.8 4 If the drafters consciously
decided to treat a Rule 19 objection which seeks joinder of a necessary
party differently from a Rule 19 objection which seeks joinder of an in8 5
dispensable party, some explanation was in order.
Finally, two statements in the advisory committee's notes to the
1966 amendments indicate the drafters were not even aware of the different treatment accorded necessary and indispensable parties. The advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 19 states:
[a] person may be added as a party at any stage of the action... and a
motion to dismiss, on the ground that a person has not been joined
and justice requires that the action should not proceed in his absence,
ruled that the objection is waived if not pleaded in a Rule 12(b) motion or the answer have relied
primarily on Rule 12(h), not Rule 12(b). See infra note 100.
80 While the objection is in the form of a motion to dismiss for failure to join a party, Rule 19(a)
defines a necessary party as one that meets the Rule 19(a) criteria and for whom joinder is feasible.
The Rule states that such a party "shall bejoined" and that "[i]fhe has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Thus, the objection for failure to join a
necessary party is tantamount to a motion to requirejoinder.
81 The Rule states that "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as arejust." FED. R. Civ. P.
21.
82 The"policy of avoiding prejudice to the absent party, multiple or inconsistent liability for the
defendant, and inefficient use ofjudicial resources is just as strong when dealing with absent persons
that may be joined as it is with absent persons that cannot be joined. See infra notes 129-133 and
accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. It is particularly ironic that courts should interpret Rules 12 and 19 in such a way that they ignore the absent party's interest in instances when
there is a relatively simple and effective solution-joinder-and accord great weight to the same
interest when the only option is dismissal, leaving the dispute unresolved.
84 Both the advisory committee and the Supreme Court have noted that the new text of Rule 19
was not designed to constitute such a change. See supra note 33. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory
committee's note (1966).
85 The advisory committee's notes generally explain the purpose of an amendment and its effect
on the law. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's note (1966) states, "This is a fundamental
change," referring to the use of the Rules in admiralty cases, and FED. R. Civ. P. 18 advisory committee's note (1966) states, "Rule 18(a) is now amended ... to overcome the Christiansondecision and
similar authority."
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may be made as late as the trial on the merits
(see Rule 12(h)(2) as
86
amended; cf. Rule 12(b)(7), as amended).

The committee here treats both joinder (which results from failure to
join a necessary party) and dismissal (which results from failure to join an
indispensable party) the same. The reference to Rules 12(h)(2) and

12(b)(7) to support both the propositions that a party may be added at
any time and that a party may be dismissed when "justice requires," indicates that any apparent differentiation between the two parties was
87
unintentional.

More importantly, the advisory committee's note says "[a] person
may be added as a party at any stage of the action." 8 8 Only necessary
parties are added; the unavailability of indispensable parties causes dismissal. The members of the advisory committee apparently believed a
party could bring a motion that resulted injoinder of a party at any stage
of the action. Hence, they undoubtedly believed the objection of failure

to join a necessary party was preserved in the same way as failure to join
89
an indispensable party.
The advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 19
also states:
[t]he subdivision uses the word "indispensable" only in a conclusory
sense, that is, a person is "regarded as indispensable" when he cannot
be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors above-mentioned, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to
dismiss the action rather than to retain it. 9 °

This comports with the committee's goal of eliminating the grouping of
parties into inflexible categories in favor of a pragmatic approach to the
issue ofjoinder. The advisory committee's notes to the amendment of
Rule 12(b)(7) specifically refer to this paragraph. 9 1 In order to treat the
objection of failure to join a necessary party differently from failure to
join an indispensable party, one must distinguish between the two categories prior to undertaking the Rule 19 analysis. This contradicts the
86 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) (citation omitted).
87 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
89 This comment is identical to a comment in the advisory committee's notes to the proposed,
but withdrawn, amendment. See supra note 29 for the text of the proposed amendment. In that text,
this comment is immediately preceded by a paragraph which explains that the term "indispensable"
has been eliminated.
The subdivision does not use the word "indispensable" which has often been employed in
the past as descriptive of persons in whose absence an action should be dismissed. "Indispensable" has suggested some iron rule of joinder based on categorization of rights,
whereas a different approach is taken in the present subdivision.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments) advisory committee's note (1964).
These identical comments to Rule 19 language that does and does not include the concept of indispensability indicate that the drafters of the Rules believed that a motion to compeljoinder of a party
is available at any time without reference to the concept of indispensability.
90 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
91 The Notes to Rule 12 say "See the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 19, as amended, especially the third paragraph therein before the caption 'Subdivision (c).' " FED. R. Civ. P. 12 advisory
committee's note (1966). Thus, the Rule 12(b)(7) reference to Rule 19 parties should be interpreted
as referring to a defense that does not distinguish between necessary and indispensable parties.
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advisory committee's statement that the term "indispensable" is only appropriate as a conclusion reached after the Rule 19 analysis.
III. Judicial Interpretation of Rule 12(h) (2)
The inconsistent references to Rule 19 parties in Rule 12 have led
courts to treat parties inconsistently. While the courts which have specifically considered the question have ruled that the objection of failure
to join a necessary party is waived if not pleaded in a Rule 12(b) motion
or in the answer, 92 other courts have allowed the objection to be made
after the answer. 9 3
A.

Courts Holding the Joinder Objection is Waived

In Citibank N.A. v. Oxford Properties & FinanceLtd. ,94 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited Rule 12 (emphasizing Rule 12(h)), saying that
"[iun federal civil procedure, failure to join a necessary party is waived if
the objection is not made in the first responsive pleading; it is only the
absence of an indispensable party which may (possibly) be raised
later." 9 5 The Tenth Circuit has taken the same position. In State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. ,96 the Tenth
Circuit pointed out that "[n]o objection was made that [the absent person] was a necessary party under Rule 19(a), so that objection is
waived." ' 97 Finally, in North Dixie Theatre Inc. v. McCullion,9 8 the district
court for the Southern District of Ohio recognized the absent parties
were necessary, but prevented the defendant from obtaining their joinder. The court held that the defendant "waived his right to present [the
objection] by not presenting it in his initial motion." 9 9
These courts relied primarily on Rule 12(h) in concluding that the
defense of failure to join a necessary party is waived if not pleaded in the
first responsive pleading.10 0
92 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
94 688 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1982).
95 Id. at 1262 n.4 (parentheses in original). The court cited "Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, esp. 12(h)."
The court also cited Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-11
(1968). The Ninth Circuit has also reached the opposite conclusion, but without specific consideration of the issue. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
96 518 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1975).
97 Id. at 294.
98 613 F.Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
99 The court stated that
[wihile the court does not dispute [defendant's] contention that the [absent persons] are
"persons to be joined if feasible," Rule 19(a), the Court will overrule this motion, because
[defendant] waived his right to present it by not presenting it in his initial motion ...Rule
12 (g) provides that when a party asserts a defense before answering a complaint, that party
must assert all defenses which can be raised by motion under Rule 12(b) or the defenses are
waived.... Although Rule 12(h)(2) preserves an indispensableparty objection, this provision
does not apply to persons who are merely necessary under Rule 19(a).
Id. at 1346 (emphasis in original).
100 The Citibank court cited "Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, esp. 12(h)." 688 F.2d at 1262 n.4. The State Farm
court cited "F.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2)." 518 F.2d at 294. The court in North Divie Theatre cited Rule
12(h)(1). 613 F.Supp. at 1346. See infra text accompanying note 124 for a discussion of this analysis. The .Vorth Dixie Theatre court relied on Rule 12(g) as well, id., but misread the rule. Rule 12(g)
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Courts Holding the Joinder Objection is Preserved

At least two circuit courts have permitted the objection of failure to
join a necessary party to be raised at a point in the proceedings at which
the courts above may have held it to have been waived. Gentry v. Smith 101
involved a contract for the sale of a hotel and the corporation that owned
it. The plaintiff sued for rescission against the individual purchaser, but
not the corporation. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court should
consider the defendant's post trial motion forjoinder. 10 2 The court did
not refer to Rule 12 but said that "the interests of justice and judicial
economy would be served by joinder or consolidation, notwithstanding
the tardiness of the motion to add a party ....
[T]hejoinder of the [absent person] is feasible, desirable,
and
would
not destroy the district
10 3
court's diversity jurisdiction."
In McCowen v. Jamieson,1 0 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a suit involving a Department of Agriculture decision regarding
food coupons. The plaintiff brought an action against the state agency
which had followed the Department's instructions. On appeal, the defendants argued for the first time that the Secretary of Agriculture was a
necessary party whose joinder should have been required. In remanding
the action to the district court, the Ninth Circuit noted the plaintiff's argument that the objection of failure to join a necessary party could not
be raised for the first time on appeal. The court responded that "[t]his
argument is wrong as a matter of law. The issue is sufficiently important
that it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings-even sua sponte."' 0 5
The court did not mention its decision in Citibank 106 two years earlier,
where it held that such an objection under the same rules of procedure
07
was waived. 1
Thus, the failure of Rule 12(h) to specify the status of the objection
of failure to join a necessary party has created a situation in which parties
does not provide that any omitted defense is waived; it simply prohibits a second 12(b) motion. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g), quoted supra note 50.
These courts did not address how a court can determine whether a party is necessary but not
indispensable without undertaking the analysis required by Rule 19. Since "[tihere is no prescribed
formula for determining in every case whether a person . . . is an indispensable party," Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 117 n.14 (1968) (citation omitted), and
"[w]hether a person is indispensable... can only be determined in the context of a particular litigation," id. at I 17, it would seem a court must analyze the objection before it can determine the absent
person's status.
101 587 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1973).
102 Id. at 580.
103 Id. at 579-80. Note that ifa court applies the analysis that only a non-joinable party may be
indispensable, see supra note 46, the party this court is discussing can only be classified as
"necessary."
104 724 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1984).
105 In support, the court cited Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 111 (1968). The court went on to say, "We are acting to protect the Secretary's interest, not
that of the appellants. We refuse to allow the Secretary to be injured by appellants' error." 724 F.2d
at 1424.
106 Citibank N.A. v. Oxford Properties & Fin. Ltd., 688 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1982).
107 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit cited Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,
390 U.S. 102 (1968), in support of both McCowen, 724 F.2d at 1424, and Citibank, 688 F.2d at 688
n.4. Thus, different panels of the same court have cited the same case in support of opposite
conclusions.
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that have identical interests in an action may be treated differently in different circuits, and even within the same circuit.
An Explanation of Why Necessary and Indispensable Parties
Should Not be Treated Differently
The disparity in the Rule 12 references to Rule 19 parties has resulted in disparate treatment of necessary and indispensable parties.
This section discusses whether there is a logical basis for such a difference in treatment and concludes that the goals of Rule 19 would be better served by eliminating the anomalous distinction.
IV.

Arguments for Disparate Treatment of Necessary and Indispensable Parties
Courts that have ruled that the objection of failure to join a necessary party is waived if it is not pleaded in the first responsive pleading
have not fashioned a rationale for their conclusion.10 8 But one commentator has suggested that there is a logical basis on which to distinguish
the objection of failure to join a necessary party from the objection of
failure to join an indispensable party.' 0 9 Moore's Federal Practice suggests two reasons for a distinction: first, because the absence of an indispensable party leads to dismissal of the case," t0 and second, because
allowing the objection would permit a defendant to delay the trial."'
One can also argue for distinguishing between the objections because of
differences in the court's discretion as to how to respond. None of these
reasons, however, are persuasive.
The argument that the objections should be treated differently because failure to join an indispensable party results in dismissal, while failure to join a necessary party results in joinder, misses the point. Failure
to join an indispensable party results in dismissal because the absent person's interests are so important that it would be inequitable for the court
to proceed without her." 2 To the degree that a necessary party's interests may be identical to an indispensable party's interests,"1 3 it is equally
inequitable to allow the court to continue in the absence of the necessary
party. The fact that joinder of the necessary party is feasible simply
means that a less drastic solution to the problem exists. The fact that
there is a less drastic solution should not be taken as a reason to ignore
the problem.
A.

108 The courts that have held the objection of failure to join a necessary party is waived simply
state so as a conclusion. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
109 Recall that there is a question as to whether there actually are distinct objections of failure to
join a necessary party and failure to join an indispensable party. See supra note 78 and accompanying
text. For the purpose of this section, the distinction will be assumed.
110 "The distinction between the timing of an objection for non-joinder of a necessary party and
an objection for failure to join an indispensable party is logical, for the absence of an indispensable
party necessitates dismissal regardless of when the objection is made." 3AJ. MOOREJ. LuCAS, & G.
GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $

19.05[2] (2d ed. 1987).

II1 "[A] party's objection to the non-joinder of a person whose joinder is feasible will be treated
as untimely if made after the pleadings are closed, since a defendant should not be allowed to postpone his objection until trial when joinder will inevitably delay resolution of the controversy." 3AJ.
1905[2] (2d ed. 1987).
MOORE, J. LUCAS, & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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Further, failure to join a necessary party does result in dismissal. If
the court, pursuant to Rule 19(a), orders a party to join an absent person
and the party fails to join that person, the court may order the case dismissed for failure to comply with a court order." 4 It is only when the
present party joins the necessary party that dismissal is avoided.
Possible delay of the trial is also an insufficient basis upon which to
distinguish the objections. It seems illogical to say that possible delay of
the action is a reason to ignore an absent person's interests, but dismissal
of the action is not."15 If anything, logic dictates the converse result.
Further, note that the right to bring either objection is not absolute but is6
subject to the court's determination that it is exercised in good faith."1
One possible reason to distinguish between the two objections is
that the court has less discretion as to its response to one than it does to
the other. If a person is necessary (that is, he meets the criteria of Rule
19(a) and joinder is feasible), the Rule states that the person "shall be
joined."' 17 It seems the court is required to order joinder, no matter
what the circumstances. Ifjoinder of the party is not feasible, however,
the court may consider any number of factors and the final determination
as to the best course of action is within the court's discretion. Thus, it
might be argued that because the court's response to the objection of
failure to join a necessary party is restricted, the availability of the objection should also be restricted. But, as noted above," 8 the objection is
subject to the court's determination that it is brought for the proper reason and with sufficient promptness.' 19 These controls, along with the
strong policies underlying Rule 19, lead to the conclusion that this, also,
is an insufficient basis for a distinction between the availability of the
objections.
B.

Errors in the Rationale Holding the Objectionfor Failure to Join a
Necessary Party Waived

Courts that have ruled that the objection of failure to join a necessary party is waived if it is not pleaded in the first responsive pleading
114 "For failure of the plaintiff ...to comply with ...any order of court, a defendant may move
for a dismissal of an action or any claim against the defendant." FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).
115 Dismissal will certainly delay the action and may, if the statute of limitations has run or there
is no other forum in which the case may be brought, actually result in loss of the action. "[R]aising
the issue of failure to join an indispensable party late in the proceedings may be devastating to a
plaintiff's cause of action, for the plaintiff will be out of court and will have to start anew, and might
then be barred by the applicable statute of limitations." 3A J. MOORE, J. LucAs, & G. GROTHEER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

19.05[2] (1987).

[Wlhen the moving party is seeking dismissal in order to protect himself against a later
suit by the absent person ... and is not seeking vicariously to protect the absent person
against a prejudicial judgment ... his undue delay in making the motion can properly be
counted against him as a reason for denying the motion.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966).
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
118 See supra note 116.
119 Further, an interpretation of Rule 19 in which the issue of feasibility ofjoinder is considered
simply an indication of when the court should engage in certain analysis, see supra note 46, might
allow the conclusion that the court can consider all the factors listed in Rule 19 in its determination
of whether to requirejoinder of a necessary party as well as whether to order dismissal because of an
indispensable party.
116
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have relied primarily on Rule 12(h).1 20 While the courts refer to the Rule
without explanation, they seem to be reading the Rule to imply that the
defense is waived by failure to plead because it is not included as one of
the defenses specifically preserved by Rule 12 (h) (2).' 21 This conclusion,
however, does not follow from the premises.' 22 The fact that Rule
12(h)(2) does not preserve the defense does not necessarily mean that it
is waived. 12 3 As discussed above,' 24 Rule 12(h) is silent on the issue of
waiver of the objection of failure to join a necessary party by failure to
plead in a Rule 12(b) motion or answer. The objection is neither specified as preserved in Rule 12(h)(2) nor specified as waived in Rule
12(h)(1). In fact, in the Ninth Circuit, where the court held that a Rule
12 defense which was omitted from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion could be
pleaded in the answer under the old Rule 12,125 the defense should still
126
be available today, since Rule 12(h)(1) does not specify it as waived.
Furthermore, this limited approach to required joinder is contradicted by Rule 21, which states that "[p]arties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as arejust."' 27 It is unreasonable to
120 See supra note 100.
121 The courts that have held the objection of failure to join a necessary party is waived make the
statement as a conclusion contrasted to the fact that the defense of failure to join an indispensable
party is preserved. Thus, the court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,
518 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1975), suggested that "[n]o objection was made that [the absent party] was a
necessary party under Rule 19(a), so that objection is waived. Rather, we are concerned with the
issue of whether [the absent party] is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). This objection can be
made at any time." Id. at 294. The court in Citibank N.A. v. Oxford Properties & Fin. Ltd., 688 F.2d
1259 (9th Cir. 1982), asserted, "In federal civil procedure, failure to join a necessary party is waived
if the objection is not made in the defendant's first responsive pleading; it is only the absence of an
indispensable party which may (possibly) be raised later." Id. at 1262. The court in North Dixie
Theatre, Inc. v. McCullion, 613 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ohio 1985), claimed, "Although Rule 12(h)(2)
preserves an indispensable party objection, this provision does not apply to persons who are merely
necessary under Rule 19(a)." Id. at 1346 (emphasis in original).
122 Were we to put this argument in syllogistic form, it would be structured:
All defenses listed in Rule 12(h)(2) are preserved from waiver by failure to plead in the
responsive pleading.
The objection of failure to join a necessary party is not listed in Rule 12(h)(2).
The objection of failure to join a necessary party is not preserved from waiver by failure
to plead in the responsive pleading.
If we let "A" stand for "all defenses listed in rule (12)(h)(2)," "B" for "preservation from waiver by
failure to plead," and "C" for "the objection of failure to join an necessary party," the argument can
be represented:
All A are B
No C are A
.*.
No C are B
The conclusion here goes beyond that which is established by the premises. It makes an assertion
about the totality of the class "B" (the "major term" of the syllogism). But the premises do not
make any assertion about the totality of "B." Thus, this is an invalid syllogism. This is commonly
called the "Fallacy of the Illicit Major." See I. Copi, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 229 (6th ed. 1982).
123 One could argue that since Rule 12(h)(2) does not list it among the Rule 12(b) objections that
are preserved, the implication is that it must be waived. This is countered by the fact that the objection is also not among the Rule 12(b) objections that are listed as waived in Rule 12(h)(l), which, by
the same logic, would imply that it was preserved.
124 See supra text accompanying note 64.
125 See Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941).
126 This is also true in those other jurisdictions which followed this line. See supra note 73.
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 21 (emphasis added).
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suggest that Rule 12 carefully limits when an objection to non-joinder
may be made while Rule 21 allows the obverse, a motion to requirejoinder, to be made at any time, without restriction.
Finally, any analysis which classifies absent persons as necessary or
indispensable prior to the Rule 19 analysis necessarily misinterprets Rule
19. Rule 19 contemplates a pragmatic analysis of the issue of compulsory joinder which does not result in a classification of parties until the
Rule 19 analysis is complete.' 28 It is inherently contradictory to say that
the classification of a person (whether she is unnecessary, necessary, or
indispensable) cannot be determined until the court completes the analysis, but the availability of the motion that brings about the analysis depends upon the classification of the person.
C.

Frustratingthe Purpose of Rule 19: Disparate Treatment of Necessary and
Indispensable Parties

As is mentioned above, there is no reason to treat necessary and
indispensable parties differently in terms of when the objection of failure
to join may be raised. 12 9 The goals of Rule 19 apply equally to both
necessary and indispensable parties.130 Indeed, there may be absolutely
no difference whatsoever between the position of an indispensable party
and a necessary party in relation to the goals of requiring compulsory
joinder. 3 1 Yet, because the difference between the Rule 12 references
to Rule 19 parties prompts some courts to misinterpret Rule 19 and apply an artificial distinction, courts may treat these parties differently. 132
For example, consider a suit to rescind a contract for the sale of government property to a private party. The plaintiffs sue the government
agency that sold the property but do not join the private purchaser. Obviously, the outcome of the litigation will necessarily affect the private
party's interests. Assume that these interests are such that a court would
find him indispensable under Rule 19. If he is not subject to service, so
that he cannot be joined in the action, Rule 12(h)(2) preserves the objection of failure to join and the court will be required to dismiss the action.
If, however, he is subject to service and can be joined, certain courts may
rule that the objection is waived if not pleaded in the time period pro128 See supra note 32.
129 See supra note 82.
130 The policies of avoiding prejudice to the absent party, multiple or inconsistent liability for the
defendant, and inefficient use ofjudicial resources are just as strong when dealing with absent persons that may be joined as it is with absent persons that cannot be joined. Id.
131 This identity of interest can be demonstrated by a hypothetical: Suppose an owner of an
undivided interest in land wishes to partition the land and brings a diversity action against one of
two others who also have an undivided interest in the land. Suppose the absent owner is the citizen
of another state and subject to service of process. In a circuit that holds the objection of failure to
join a necessary party waived if not pleaded in or before the answer, the court would hold that the
absent person is necessary, but that the objection has been waived if not pleaded in or before the
answer. Now suppose the absent person moves into the same state as the plaintiff, so that joinder
would destroy diversity. The absent person now meets all the criteria for an indispensable party and
the defendant can bring a motion to dismiss for failure to join the person at any stage in the proceeding. This analysis applies equally to any absent party who isjoinable at one stage but not joinable at
a later stage of the action.
132 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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vided by Rule 12(h)(1).13

3

In each case, the prejudice to the third party,

the inefficiency of the adjudication, and the possibility of inconsistent
claims against the defendant are the same. Yet the parties are treated
differently.
Disparate treatment of necessary and indispensable parties actually
thwarts achievement of the purposes of Rule 19. As the example above
demonstrates, waiver of the objection of failure to join a necessary party
prevents the courts from adjudicating the issue in a way that will prevent
prejudice to the absent party, avoid additional litigation, and avoid im134
posing multiple or inconsistent liabilities upon the defendant.
V. Resolving the Rule 19/Rule 12 Conflict
Some courts have interpreted the difference in wording between
Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(h) in a way that inequitably treats like parties
differently. 13 5 While the best solution to this inequity would be a technical amendment of Rule 12(h)(2), a practitioner can take certain steps to
obtain equitable treatment for necessary parties immediately. A judicial
interpretation of Rule 12 which is consistent with the goals of Rule 19
would also eliminate the problem.
A. The Simple Solution: Amendment of Rule 12
The simplest way to eliminate inequitable treatment of necessary
and indispensable parties would be to amend Rule 12(h)(2) to comport
with the 1966 amendment of Rules 19 and 12(b)(7). The pre-1966 term
"indispensable" should be deleted, leaving the section to say "a defense
of failure to join a party under Rule 19," as does Rule 12(b)(7). 1 3 6 The
amended Rule 12(h) (2) would read
(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, a defense of failure to join a party under Rule 19, and an
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made in
any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.
This would clarify the status of the Rule 19(a) objection and protect the
interests underlying Rule 19 by assuring that all parties who have similar
37
interests in an action would be treated alike.'
133 Id.
134 Rule 21, however, gives the court the power to accomplish the very same joinder. See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 94-100, 129-34 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 19.
137 There is a potential problem with this amendment in regards to the court's discretion in ordering joinder of parties who meet the Rule 19(a) criteria and for whom joinder is feasible. The
current Rule 19(a) might be interpreted as requiring the court to order joinder. See supra note 47
and accompanying text. This would allow a party to use the objection for dilatory purposes. While
the advisory committee's note indicates the court should have discretion in this area, supra note 116,
it is unclear whether the Rule itself grants such discretion.
While an extensive discussion of Rule 19 is beyond the scope of this Note, the problem might be
solved by amending Rule 19 to specify that feasibility ofjoinder is simply one criterion the court may
use in determining the best course of action and clarify that the decision to orderjoinder of a necessary party, as well as whether to order dismissal because of an indispensable party, is within the
discretion of the court. This could be accomplished by making three changes. First, changing the
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PractitionerSafeguards

Practitioners also can take steps to alleviate the unfair treatment of
persons who are "merely necessary." The most obvious, of course, is to
be sure to bring any objection for failure to join a party in the Rule 12(b)
motion, if one is made, or in the answer. Even if a Rule 12(b) motion has

been made, the objection should be available in the answer in those jurisdictions which so held under the pre-1966 rule.' 38 The defendant's
briefs in support of the motion, however, will have to
carefully explain
13 9
that 12(h) does not control this particular objection.

Practitioners might also avoid the problem by characterizing all Rule
19 motions as motions to join an indispensable party. 140 If the motion
argues that the party is indispensable, it is not waived. This should cause
the court to begin the Rule 19 analysis. If the court finds the party 4is1
necessary butjoinable, Rule 19 states that the party "shall be joined."'
If the court sees through this stratagem, however, and holds that the

party cannot be indispensable because the party is joinable, it may dismiss the motion without considering the Rule 19 issues.
Additionally, practitioners can avoid the necessary/indispensable
party dichotomy altogether by bringing a motion to orderjoinder under
Rule 21.142 While Rule 21 does not require a court to apply the Rule 19
analysis, that analysis would seem the most likely to be used to determine
whether joinder is on "terms as are just.' 143 Rule 21 specifically states
imperative "shall" in the first and second sentences of Rule 19(a) to a permissive "may." Second,
changing the first sentence of Rule 19(b) to make the Rule 19(b) criteria applicable to the decision of
whether to order joinder of a necessary party as well as the decision of whether to order dismissal
because of the unavailability of an indispensable party. Third, removing the references to feasibility
ofjoinder in the opening sentences of Rules 19(a) and 19(b) and listing feasibility ofjoinder as an
additional criterion under Rule 19(b).
Such an amendment would clarify the amount of discretion the court has in regards to all actions pursuant to Rule 19. It would also eliminate the confusion over whether feasibility ofjoinder is
a substantive criterion for indispensability. Moreover, it would further focus the courts' consideration of the compulsory joinder issue on the practical effects of proceeding without the absent party,
ordering joinder, or dismissing the case.
138 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
139 The court may very well interpret Rule 12 as barring such a motion. The plaintiff is almost
certain to cite the cases discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 94-100. The defendant will
have to explain to the court that Rule 12 is actually silent on the treatment of necessary parties in this
context, see supra text accompanying notes 64-65, and show that the objection should be preserved.
See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
140 At least one court, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 518 F.2d
292 (9th Cir. 1975), referred to the characterization of the absent persons as "necessary" in the
appellant's brief as affecting its decision.
This is solely a matter of characterization. The moving party simply moves for dismissal for
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19, a motion preserved by Rule 12(h)(2). Alternatively, the party requests the court to order joinder, should the court determine the party is necessary rather than indispensable (note that Rule 19(a) is worded in the imperative, "a person who [is
necessary] shall be joined as a party to the action," FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)). The moving party would
expect to lose the motion to dismiss, hoping to obtain the alternative remedy.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
142 Rule 21 provides: "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as arejust." FED. R. Civ. P.
21.
143 Id. Rule 21 provides forjoinder "on such terms as are just." FED. R. Civ. P. 21. Rule 19 is
designed to securejoinder of a party when "justice requires that the action should not proceed in his
absence." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's notes (1966). Since justice is the determining
criterion in each case, the factors defined in Rule 19, see supra note 19, should also apply to Rule 21.
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that the motion is appropriate "at any stage of the action."1 4 4 The Rule
21 motion will have the same effect as the objection for failure to join a
party under Rule 19.145 If the party is not joined, the defendant can
the grounds that the plaintiff has
move for dismissal under Rule 41 (b) on
46
failed to comply with a court order.
C. An AlternativeJudicial Interpretation
Finally, the courts can eliminate the problem by interpreting Rule 12
as preserving an objection for failure to join any party under Rule 19.
There are several bases for such an interpretation.
The first is simply that Rule 12 is silent on whether the objection of
failure to join a necessary party is waived or preserved when not pleaded
in the first responsive pleading. 147 The courts may, therefore, determine
the status of this objection. The Rules, however, have indicated a strong
policy of protecting the motion for failure to join a party under Rule 19
from waiver. The fact that Rule 12(h)(2) specifically preserves the objection for failure to join an indispensable party demonstrates this. While,
as noted above,' 48 there may be absolutely no difference between the
interests of necessary and indispensable parties in reference to the issue
of compulsory joinder, the objection of failure to join an indispensable
party may result in dismissal of the case, while the objection of failure to
join a necessary party results in compulsory joinder of the party. Since
the Rules specify that the objection should be preserved. in a case where
the greater difficulties caused by dismissal may be imposed on the litigants, the better interpretation is that the objection should also be preserved when the difficulties are less.
Second, Rule 19 was intended to abolish any "formalistic distinction
between 'necessary' and 'indispensable' parties,"' 4 9 and eliminates any
distinction between parties prior to the conclusion of the Rule 19 analysis.1 -50 Since the status of absent persons as necessary or indispensable
cannot be determined prior to the Rule 19 analysis, Rule 12(h)(2) must
be interpreted to preserve the objection of failure to join any person
under Rule 19 from waiver by failure to plead in the first responsive
pleading. 151
FED. R. Civ. P. 21, supra note 81.
When joinder is necessary and feasible, Rule 19(a) provides that the party "shall be joined."
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Thus, the objection for failure to join has the same effect as a motion to order
joinder.
146 Rule 41 states: "For failure of the plaintiff. . . to comply with . . . any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or any claim against defendant." FED. R. Cxv. P.
41(b).
147 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
149 Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205 (11th Cir. 1985).
150 See supra note 32.
151 An alternative analysis is to note that a party may only be "regarded as indispensable," FED.
R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966), as a conclusion based on the Rule 19(b) analysis.
The Rule 19(b) analysis is preceded by, and necessarily includes, a Rule 19(a) analysis of whether the
party is necessary. Since the analysis of indispensability includes the issue of necessity, an objection
based on indispensability necessarily includes an objection based on necessity. Ergo, the preservation of the objection for failure to join an indispensable party necessarily includes preservation of
the objection for failure to join a necessary party.

144
145
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Finally, preservation of -the objection of failure to join any party
under Rule 19 may also be based on Rule 12 itself. Rule 12(h)(2) preserves the objection of "failure to join a party indispensable under Rule
19."152 But there is no such objection in Rule 12. The objection is for
"failure to join a party under Rule 19.' 153 Thus, Rule 12(h)(2) seems to
preserve an objection which does not exist, and the objection listed in
Rule 12(b)(7) seems to fall outside the purview of Rule 12(h). 154 The
best way to reconcile Rule 12(h)(2) with Rule 12(b)(7) is to hold the term
"indispensable" to be superfluous. Rule 12(h)(2) would, therefore, preserve the objection of failure to join any party under Rule 19.
Each of these interpretations of the Rules provides a logical basis
upon which to hold that the objection for failure to join a necessary party
is not waived by failure to plead in the first responsive pleading. Such an
interpretation properly applies the analysis specified by Rule 19, protects
the purposes underlying the doctrine of compulsory joinder, and elimi155
nates the inequity of treating like parties differently.
VI.

Conclusion

Similar treatment of similar parties is one of the basic goals of the
American judicial system. Because of an oversight in the 1966 amendment of Rule 12(h), however, similarly situated parties are sometimes
treated differently. Some circuit courts have ruled that courts can ignore
the interests of a necessary party who may have the exact same relationship to an action as an indispensable party. Moreover, this inequitable
treatment has occurred in circumstances where the court would be required to protect the indispensable party's interest, even to the point of
dismissing the case.
A variation in the wording of Rule 12, which leads to misinterpretation of Rule 19, produces this differentiation. Ajudicial interpretation of
Rule 19 in accord with the purposes of Rule 19 would more effectively
achieve the Rule's goals of judicial economy and equitable treatment.
Practitioners may, to a certain degree, accomplish the same goals by artful characterization of their motions. The most effective solution to the
inequitable treatment of necessary and indispensable parties, however, is
an amendment of Rule 12(h)(2) to eliminate the differentiating wording.
Such an amendment would guide the courts back to "equity and good
conscience" in dealing with necessary but joinable absent persons.
W Casey Walls
152 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
153 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).
154 If the court finds a distinct objection of failure to join an indispensable party exists, there
must, likewise, be a distinct objection of failure to join a necessary party. Since Rule 12(h) ignores
this objection, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, the court must confront the issue of the
status of this later objection after the responsive pleading. Since the goals served by preserving
either objection are identical, see supra notes 129-34, the better interpretation is that the objection of
failure to join a necessary party should be preserved.
155 Once these interpretations are applied, an issue arises concerning the court's discretion when
ruling on an objection for failure to join a necessary party. See supra note 137.

